Power Rotation in Kogi State Must Not Become a Three-Horse Race
By Akerejola Abiodun
The communique from the Kogi State Power Rotation Summit has drawn a muted reaction, but the quiet should not be mistaken for consent. Many observers were not surprised by the outcome. What stands out is how hastily the technical committee produced it, with little probing of submissions and little of the intellectual depth that so weighty a task demands. A matter that will shape the destiny of millions for decades was treated as a formality. The conclusion looked predetermined, divergent voices were silenced, and groups that raised honest questions were treated as opponents of government rather than as joint stakeholders in the Kogi project.
The legitimate grievance, and its limits
Kogi West’s demand for a seat at the table is legitimate. Two of the three major zones have held the governorship over time, and a state that claims to value fairness cannot dismiss the aggrieved party. That agitation is what convened the summit.
But a rotation formula built only around the Igala, Ebira and Okun blocs solves one problem by creating another. It treats the three senatorial districts as the only parties to the contract, and it asks a question the committee never answered: what is reserved for the minorities of Kogi State?
Who the minorities are, and how many
The minority communities include Bassa, Kogi (Koton Karfe), Lokoja, Ibaji, Ogori-Magongo and Ajaokuta local government areas. They are not a footnote to the state’s politics. The figures from the 2023 governorship election show how substantial they are.
Local government area
Senatorial district
Registered voters
2023 winner
Bassa
Kogi East
69,376
APC
Ibaji
Kogi East
90,556
SDP
Ajaokuta
Kogi Central
96,504
APC
Ogori-Magongo
Kogi Central
17,688
APC*
Lokoja
Kogi West
157,248
APC
Kogi (Koton Karfe)
Kogi West
63,342
APC
Total
All three districts
494,714
5 of 6 to APC
*Ogori-Magongo: INEC reported only 665 accredited voters against 17,688 registered, and the returning officer reportedly said no election held in 10 of its 11 wards. Source: INEC LGA results for the 11 November 2023 election, declared 12 November, as collated by Legit.ng; Ripples Nigeria.
Together, these six local government areas hold 494,714 of the state’s 1,932,474 registered voters, or 25.6 per cent. That is larger than the entire Kogi Central district (24.6 per cent) and within touching distance of Kogi West (26.2 per cent), the zone whose claim to the governorship the summit was convened to address.
Bloc
LGAs
Registered voters
Share of state
Kogi East senatorial district
9
952,189
49.3%
Kogi West senatorial district
7
505,731
26.2%
Six minority LGAs
6
494,714
25.6%
Kogi Central senatorial district
5
474,554
24.6%
District shares are computed from the same INEC LGA figures. The minority LGAs sit inside the three districts, so the shares overlap and do not add up to 100 per cent.
There is a second fact the committee should have confronted. The six minority areas are spread across all three senatorial districts: Bassa and Ibaji in Kogi East, Ajaokuta and Ogori-Magongo in Kogi Central, and Lokoja and Kogi in Kogi West. A rotation formula that works by senatorial district therefore cannot see them. No matter whose turn it is, they are always a minority inside somebody else’s zone.
A pattern that predates the summit
Political participation brings patronage, attention and development. Where a community holds no stake, it gets neglected.
When Mr. Edward Onoja served as Chief of Staff to then Governor Yahaya Bello, he formed a platform for the Ebira, Igala and Okun peoples, known by the acronym EBIGO. By the account of many observers, the platform was strong enough to draw government patronage and development toward the areas where those groups predominate, and the minority areas were left behind. More recently, the Senator representing the Western Senatorial District has called on the Igala to support his drive to rotate power to the Okun, with no mention of any minority area.
When alliances are repeatedly built across the three major groups without a word for the rest, minority communities are right to ask whether they are being treated as partners or as a vote bank. Are they subservient to the point of irrelevance? Are they there only to fill an elective vacuum, with no stake in what is filled?
The silence on micro-zoning and basketing
The committee also ignored two issues that matter as much as the governorship:
Micro-zoning of other elective offices. Without it, the senatorial seats, House of Representatives seats, State Assembly leadership and local government chairmanships stay with the same dominant communities, and the less endowed never get to be represented.
Basketing and equitable sharing of offices. Appointive and elective positions, especially the lucrative ones, tend to concentrate in the zone or local government area where power is domiciled. A rotation formula that ignores this only changes the address of the concentration.
This is not a design for fairness, equity and transparency. It is a design that leaves the minorities permanently at the margins.
Answering the objections
A serious case must meet the strongest arguments against it. Five are likely, and each has an answer.
1. “The three senatorial districts are the established units.”
Senatorial districts are electoral constituencies for the National Assembly. They are not a constitutional formula for sharing the governorship, and the Constitution does not prescribe rotation at all; it is a political convention. What the Constitution does say, in Section 14(4), is that the composition of a state government must recognise the diversity of the peoples in the state and promote a sense of belonging and loyalty among all of them. A convention that leaves six local government areas with no defined place in the cycle sits uneasily with that principle. And because those six areas are spread across all three districts, defending the districts as the only units is a way of defending their exclusion.
2. “Rotation already reflects population.”
It does not. By registered voters, Kogi East holds about 49 per cent of the electorate while Kogi West and Kogi Central hold about 26 and 25 per cent. A formula of one turn per district gives each district an equal share regardless of size, so it is a convention of equal turns, not a proportional one. Those who defend it cannot suddenly invoke population when a minority claim is raised. If numbers are the test, the 25.6 per cent held by the six minority LGAs must count. If equal standing is the test, a bloc the size of Kogi Central cannot be given nothing.
3. “The minority LGAs are too small or too divided to claim a turn.”
They are not too small. At 494,714 registered voters they outnumber Kogi Central. They are also politically competitive rather than captive. In 2023 the APC won five of the six, but the margin in Bassa was under 2,000 votes (9,515 for the APC against 7,543 for the SDP), while Ibaji went to the SDP. These are communities that vote on the merits, which is exactly why parties should not take them for granted. As for division, the answer is that a slot does not require a single candidate. The communities can agree on a process among themselves, as the major blocs do, and the formula can set the principle while leaving the selection to them.
4. “Too many micro-zones will make Kogi ungovernable.”
The demand is modest. It is not to split the state into twenty-one fiefdoms. It is for one defined slot in the cycle, a transparent basketing rule for appointive offices, and a published framework for other elective positions. A written, predictable formula reduces conflict because every community knows when its turn comes and what it is entitled to in the meantime. The real threat to stability is the opposite: a convention that communities believe has been rigged against them.
5. “Kogi West has waited long enough; a minority claim only delays justice.”
This is a false choice. The argument here does not deny Kogi West its turn. It asks that the settlement be written so that, once West has its turn, the cycle does not close again on the same three blocs. A dated, published sequence that includes a minority slot settles the question for everyone. A formula that excludes the minorities only postpones the next agitation, and this time from a bloc that is a quarter of the state.
What a credible formula must contain
If the process is to be reopened, and it should be, it must meet some minimum conditions:
A defined minority slot in the rotation cycle, so that the governorship or deputy governorship is not reserved only for the three major blocs, with the sequence written down and published.
A binding micro-zoning framework for all other elective offices, covering the National Assembly seats, the State Assembly and the local government councils.
A basketing principle for appointive offices, so that key positions are not concentrated in the zone holding the governorship.
Development safeguards, including a transparent, published formula for siting projects and sharing resources so that political exclusion does not become infrastructural exclusion.
An open process in which minority communities are at the table as full participants rather than invited as an afterthought.
Conclusion
Power rotation in Kogi should be all-encompassing, not a winner-takes-all contest among three groups. The six minority local government areas hold a quarter of the state’s registered voters, are scattered across every senatorial district, and delivered five of the twelve local government areas won by the winning party in 2023. In a closely fought contest, a bloc of that size can tip the result, and the state’s stability depends on its sense of belonging. A chain is only as strong as its weakest link. Power rotation and the zoning of offices are not for the benefit of the zone whose turn it is. They exist for inclusivity and the advantage of all. No rotation formula can be effective, or legitimate, without a considerable and clearly defined allotment to the minorities henceforth.
